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Abstract
This article explores the relationship between international trade law, foreign
direct investment (FDI), and economic growth of developing countries. Here, I
argue that a developing state needs to capture the right combination of the
different types of FDI to promote domestic growth. I apply principles of law,
economics, and finance to my analysis of the importance of Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BITs), compared to Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) to FDI inflow,
and how it can impact economic growth in developing countries. I show that the
RTAs give a signal that the country is open to foreign investment, and therefore
it promotes FDI inflow more efficiently than BITs. Nevertheless, there are
different levels of states’ commitment to free trade, and to the RTA signed, which
does impact the kind of FDI received. I compare Brazil and Mexico’s FDI inflow
and national regulatory governance to illustrate my theory. Finally, I propose
that the goal of developing countries’ international trade policy should go further
than just the promotion of FDI inflow. It should focus on promoting the right
combination of the different types of FDI inflow that will promote long term
investment and stable economic growth.
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1.

INTRODUCTION
International economic law scholars consider the relationship between
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the inflow of foreign direct
investment (FDI) an important empirical question.1 Many studies have
ventured into the exercise of statistical analysis to answer this question
without achieving a final consistent theory.2 I believe that the answer to this
question is not relevant; I may venture to say that “do BITs work?” is not the
important question. BITs do present a cost to the countries signing them,
which should be offset by the increase in the inflow of FDI. I do agree that
FDI does promote economic growth, but I believe that we should better
qualify the question by asking “what type of FDI” or “what combination”
brings the most benefits to developing countries.
The current assumption is that BITs promote protections for foreign
investors, therefore creating an incentive for investments in the developing
country that is party to the BIT. But after some research, I found an indication
that BITs may not deliver as promised, which moved me to identify other
legal instruments that can promote FDI inflow.
In this paper, I aim to assess the relationship between Regional Trade
Agreements (RTAs), FDI inflow, and developing countries’ economic
growth. I show here that RTAs are better instruments than BITs, as they
impact domestic governance. In this study, I will compare Brazil and
Mexico’s FDI inflow and national regulatory governance to illustrate my
theory. Instead of focusing on BITs, I use RTAs, MERCOSUR, and NAFTA
to identify how they impacted the domestic regulatory system of each country
respectively and the influx of FDI. I also break FDI into horizontal and
vertical investments and qualify it as greenfield or merger and acquisition
(M&A) type.3 Applying these distinctions, I found theoretical evidence that
for developing countries to achieve stable economic growth it requires not
only the influx of FDI, but a balance between greenfield and M&A inflow.
Next, I will discuss the literature and the foundational basis for my
theory. In Part 3, I present the key characteristics of the different types of
foreign direct investment (FDI), and how each one impacts economic growth.
In Part 4, I discuss Mexico’s motivations to conclude the NAFTA agreement,
and how its commitment fit with Mexico’s economic policy at the time, and
the importance of the USMCA (as a continuation of NAFTA) to Mexico’s
economic growth. In Part 5, I discuss the MERCOSUR in more detail, review
its more than twenty-five years of existence, and evaluate its impact on
Brazil’s regulatory governance, the promotion of FDI inflow, and Brazil’s
economic growth. Finally, in the conclusion, I emphasize the results from the
1
Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct
Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L. L. 397, 442 (2011).
2
Id. at 405 (Prof. Yackee presents a review of the empirical literature).
3
In part 3, labeled Foreign Direct Investment, I explain each one of these qualifications
of investment in detail.
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adoption of trade liberalization policy versus promotion of domestic industry
policy along with my final considerations and recommendations.
2.

THE FOUNDATIONS – A MULTIDISCIPLINARY OVERVIEW
Professor Yackee, applying three different tests, found that “BITs spur
investment only irregularly, inconsistently, and with generally unassuming
impact.”4 Reviewing the literature on BITs, FDIs, and economic growth one
can conclude that investors do not take BITs into consideration when
assessing foreign investment opportunities,5 and that influx of FDI is not of
major importance for the economic growth of developing countries when
taken separately.6
One such example is Brazil. The country is well recognized for its
aversion to international arbitration mechanisms.7 The argument presented to
justify such aversion alludes to the unfairness of privileging foreign investors
to the detriment of domestic investors.8 To this effect, from 1994 to October
2019 Brazil has signed 26 BITs, and only one is still in force.9 As of the
writing of this paper, the only Brazilian BIT in force is the one signed with
Angola in 2015.10 Under this BIT, there is no investor-state dispute resolution
mechanism, just state-to-state arbitration. However, the arbitration can only
be initiated after the disputing state brings the issue to a special committee
but is not satisfied with the committee’s final recommendation.11 Even
though Brazil does not have BITs, the country has been able to capture
expressive FDI over the years, which is contrary to what would be expected
Yackee, supra note 1, at 434.
Yackee, supra note 1, at 414.
6
Paul Krugman, International Finance and Economic Development, in FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES AND EXPERIENCE 11 (Alberto Giovannini ed., 1993). Here, Krugman
states that capital accumulation is not of major importance for economic growth and that there
is no historical evidence that capital would flow from rich into poor countries due to financial
liberalization. Id. at 14-22. Further in this paper, I will demonstrate that recent literature may
offer a qualification to Krugman’s theory.
7
Paulo Cavallo, Brazil, BITs and FDI: A Synthetic Control Approach, Journal of World
Investment & Trade 20 (2019) 68–97, at 75. Brazil has refused to sign the ICSID Convention,
and as the Cavallo mentions, Brazil’s Congress had not ratified BITs because arbitration is
seen as interfering with the country’s sovereignty.
8
Id.
9
International Investment Agreements Navigator – Brazil, UNCTAD, https://
investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/27/brazil (last
visited in Nov. 24, 2019).
10
Id.
11
Acordo de Cooperação e Facilitação de Investimentos Entre o Governo da República
Federativa do Brasil e o Governo da República de Angola, Brazil-Angola, § IV art. 15, 2015,
https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/treatyfiles/4720/download. This committee has equal representation from both states and is formed
once a complaint is presented by one of the states. Id. at § II art. 4. However, the many steps
that are set up before the arbitration can in fact make the arbitrage an unlikely occurrence. See
id. at § IV art. 15.
4
5
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if BITs are necessary to promote FDI inflow. Graphic 1 below shows Brazil’s
FDI inflow from 1991 to 2017.12 From 1994 to 2000 there was an increase in
FDI inflow, even though no BIT was in place. If not BITs, then what does
promote FDI inflow? I propose that Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) are
a better instrument than BITs to promote FDI inflow.

Brazil BRA Foreign direct investment, net inflows
(BoP, current US$) BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD
1.2E+11
1E+11
8E+10
6E+10
4E+10
2E+10
0
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

This graphic also shows us that the inflow of foreign direct investment
in Brazil was not stable, and the drops in investment were timed with
economic crises and domestic political instability. From 2000 to 2003 Brazil
experienced a monetary crisis and the uncertainty of the policies that would
be implemented by the newly elected president, Mr. Lula da Silva.13 Then
FDI inflow increased under the administration of President Lula, but it
dropped almost halfway during the economic crisis in 2008, as graphic 1
shows. Brazil experienced another substantial increase soon after, but it did
not resist the political turmoil under allegations of corruption at the highest
level of administration, which led to a presidential impeachment.14
I believe that these spurs of growth followed by a deep decrease in the
inflow of FDI, as seen in the graphic above, require further qualification to
12
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) – Brazil, THE WORLD BANK
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=BR (last visited
Nov. 24, 2019).
13
Mr. Lula da Silva is a member of the Labor Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores), and was
the first left-wing candidate ever elected in Brazil.
14
In April 2016, Ms. Dilma Rousseff was the second President of Brazil to be impeached.
She was elected under the support of Mr. Lula da Silva.
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my initial assumption. It is not only the existence of RTAs that matter, but
specific characteristics within the RTAs. As I discuss below, the RTAs give
a signal that the country is open to foreign investment, therefore, it promotes
FDI inflow. Nevertheless, in this paper, I show that there are different levels
of the state’s commitment to free trade, and to the RTA signed, which does
impact the kind of FDI received. Finally, I propose that the goal of
developing countries’ international trade policy should go further than just
the promotion of FDI inflow. It should focus on the promotion of the right
combination of the different types of FDI inflow that will promote long term
investment and stable economic growth.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many countries that were traditionally
closed to foreign investment started opening their markets due to the need for
capital inflows.15 Brazil and Mexico were no exceptions; however, each
country embraced a very different policy strategy. Mexico embraced trade
liberalization16 and the jurisdiction of international law through investment
arbitration mechanisms,17 whereas Brazil focused on state promotion of
domestic industries,18 and avoided international arbitration mechanisms.
Because MERCOSUR and NAFTA are the most important regional
trade agreements signed by Brazil and Mexico respectively, I focus on the
effects each agreement had on the national regulatory governance of each
country, and how it impacted the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI)
in Brazil and Mexico. Graphic 2 below shows us the inflow of FDI in Brazil
(blue line) and Mexico (orange line).19 Brazil has received a higher inflow of
FDI overall; however, Mexico’s inflow of FDI was less affected than Brazil’s
inflow during the periods of economic crisis. In this paper, I aim to explain
the reason for this difference and its impact on the countries’ economic
growth, considering the impact of MERCOSUR and NAFTA in each country
respectively.

15
See generally DAVID A. GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE, (1st ed. 2009) [hereinafter GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS].
16
Alvaro Santos, Carving out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World
Trade Organizations: The Experience of Brazil and Mexico, 52 VA. J. INT’L. L. 551, 551-632
(2012).
17
Sergio Puig, NAFTA Authority and Political Behavior: The Case of Mexico, 5 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 363, 371-77 (2007).
18
Santos, supra note 16.
19
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$) – Brazil, Mexico, THE
WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=BRMX. (Last visited Nov. 24, 2019).

145

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

41:139 (2021)

Brazil - Mexico FDI Inflow
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Brazil BRA Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$)
BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD
Mexico MEX Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current US$)
BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD

More than twenty-five years after both agreements entered into force,
much has changed in the international and domestic scenario for both
countries. MERCOSUR has not achieved the expected unification goal. On
the other hand, NAFTA, although generally successful, has been renegotiated
recently by its members. The new United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA) was signed by the members on November 30th, 2018. The
USMCA entered into force and replace the NAFTA in June 2020.20 Although
the USMCA presents a few and quite important changes to NAFTA, I will
not discuss them here because my analysis focuses on the past impact of
NAFTA. I do believe that USMCA requires further study to identify how it
will impact Mexico’s FDI inflow, but it is not for this paper. For now, I
appraise the impact of regulatory changes implemented by Brazil and Mexico
under the influence of these RTAs and assess the impact of both agreements
on FDI inflow in the respective countries.
This study will better inform Brazilian and Mexican policymakers
towards structuring new regulatory reforms that can best promote
development. This topic is quite current as Brazil and Mexico have new
Presidents, both elected on a platform that called for major changes from the
20
The USMCA is set to enter into force on June 1, 2020. The agreement was ratified by
Mexico on June 19, 2019. The United States ratified it on January 29, 2020, after adding
stronger labor provisions. It was finally ratified by Canada on March 13, 2020 without
changes.
A
new
Canada-United
States-Mexico
Agreement,
CANADA.CA,
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
agr-acc/cusma-aceum/index.aspx?lang=eng (last visited March 16, 2021).
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economic policies of their previous governments. This paper also adds to the
current literature as it presents a novel approach to the study of the
relationship between FDIs, regulatory governance, and economic growth in
developing countries.
The recent economic and political crises Brazil has experienced offer an
opportunity for re-evaluation of recent policies and regulations, leading to
recommendations for deep and substantial reforms that can better support
sustainable economic growth. Some of the reforms recommended and
discussed in this paper are being currently addressed by the Brazilian
President, Mr. Jair Bolsonaro.21
Vast literature, especially in economics, has indicated the importance of
law and legal institutions to economic growth, presenting empirical and
theoretical evidence of the positive effect of credible legal rules and
institutions in economic growth and FDI inflow.22 Globerman and Shapiro
identified governance infrastructure as an important determinant of FDI
inflow and outflow.23 Brunetti, Kisunko & Weder developed an indicator of
the “credibility of rules” and ran a regression model, using 73 countries; the
results showed significant association between credibility and cross-country
differences in economic growth and investment.24 A Buchanan, Le, and Rishi
study has shown a direct relationship between institutional quality and
volatility of FDI.25 Furthermore, poor institutional quality increases volatility
of FDI inflow and volatile inflow has negative influences on economic
growth, as Lensink and Morrisey have found.26
Historically, Brazil has embraced a less ambitious strategy on trade
liberalization with shallow measures to open its market, maintaining its
loyalty to the development of domestic industries in detriment of the
liberalization of trade. Since then, the FDI pattern in Brazil has been volatile,
generating spurts of economic growth followed by long periods of

21
I will discuss the current recommendations being addressed by the Brazilian
government within the presentation of the recommendations in Part 4.
22
Fathi A. Ali, Norbert Fiess & Ronald MacDonald, Do Institutions Matter for Foreign
Direct Investment?, 21 OPEN ECON. REV. 201, 201–19 (2010); Frank B. Cross, Law and
Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737 (2002).
23
Steven Globerman & Daniel Shapiro, Global Foreign Direct Investment Flows: The
Role of Governance Infrastructure, 30 WORLD DEV. 1899 (2002). This article defines
governance infrastructure as political, institutional and legal environment.
24
Aymo Brunetti, Gregory Kisunko, & Beatrice Weder, Credibility of Rules and
Economic Growth: Evidence from a Worldwide Survey of the Private Sector, 12 WORLD BANK
ECON. REV. 353 (1998) (the indicators of credibility in this model are: predictability of rulemaking, subjective perception of political instability, security of persons and property,
predictability of judicial enforcement, and corruption).
25
Bonnie G. Buchanan, Quan V. Le, & Meenakshi Rishi, Foreign Direct Investment and
Institutional Quality: Some Empirical Evidence, 21 INT’L REV. FIN. ANALYSIS 81 (2012).
26
Robert Lensink. & Oliver Morrissey, Foreign Direct Investment: Flows, Volatility and
the Impact on Growth, 14 REV. INT’L ECON. 478 (2001).
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recession.27 Brazil’s strategy requires a domestic entrepreneurial
environment to promote economic growth.28 However, Brazil’s regulations
and public policy do not foment a favorable business entrepreneurial
environment.29
On the other hand, Mexico has adopted a policy of trade liberalization,
especially with its neighbor, the United States.30 With the exception of a few
programs aiming to help small and medium size business as well as the export
industry, Mexico dismantled most of its protectionist industrial policies.31
Mexico’s regulatory reform was crowned with the conclusion of NAFTA,
which bound the country’s commitment to market liberalization policy, even
attaching to future government leadership. Leadership in Mexico changes
every six years with Presidential elections, but since NAFTA the
administrations prior to current President López Obrador32 maintained, and
in recent years furthered, regulatory reform. The effect of NAFTA has been
an increase in inward flow of FDI and a change in the investors’ perceptions
of factors that determine FDI.33 One example of regulatory change is the
reform on secured transactions laws based on the UNCITRAL Model Law,34
and the changes to the Foreign Investment Law (1993) that relax the
limitations imposed on the majority of capital flows, government approval
requirements, and management control allowed to foreign investors.35
Another positive impact credited to NAFTA are the improvements to the
banking regulatory system.36 Although Mexico has promoted many legal
reforms to support more globalized growth, it has not fulfilled all the
Thorsten Beck, Impediments to the Development and Efficiency of Financial
Intermediation in Brazil, WORLD BANK FIN. SECTOR STRATEGY & POL’Y DEP’T (Policy
Research Working Paper, June 2000); Inflação passa de 10% em 12 meses pela primeira vez
desde 2003, VEJA (Dec. 9, 2015) http://veja.abril.com.br/noticia/economia/inflacao-passa-de10-em-12-meses-pela-primeira-vez-desde-2003.
28
Buchanan et al., supra note 25, at 82.
29
Otaviano Canuto, Matheus Cavallari, & José Guilherme Reis, The Brazilian
Competitiveness Cliff, WORLD BANK ECON. PREMISE, (Feb. 2013).
30
Santos, supra note 16, at 551.
31
Santos, supra note 16; Andreas Waldkirch, The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment in
Mexico Since NAFTA, 33 WORLD ECON. 710 (2010) [hereinafter Waldkirch, Effects].
32
Although being elected on a protectionist platform, López Obrador’s administration
has maintained the commitment through the renegotiations of NAFTA, which concluded with
the creation of the USMCA that had already been ratified by Mexico.
33
Andreas Waldkirch, The ‘New Regionalism’ and Foreign Direct Investment: The Case
of Mexico, 12 J. INT’L TRADE & ECON. DEV.151 (2003) [hereinafter Waldkirch, New
Regionalism].
34
Boris Kozolchyk & Cristina Castaneda, Invigorating Micro and Small Businesses
Through Secured Commercial Credit in Latin America: The Need for Legal and Institutional
Reform, 28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 43 (2011); Boris Kozolchyk, Secured Lending and Its
Poverty Reduction Effect, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 727 (2006).
35
Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31.
36
Ross Levine, International Financial Liberalization and Economic Growth, 9 REV.
INT’L ECON. 688, 697-98 (2001).
27
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commitments under NAFTA, which may explain the initial timid impact of
NAFTA.37
Overall, it seems that the “take it or leave it”38 approach adopted by the
United States during the negotiations of NAFTA positively influenced
Mexico, encouraging regulatory changes. Nevertheless, like any other
regional trade agreement, NAFTA has its shortcomings. The fact that Mexico
took more than ten years to promote and implement the necessary regulatory
changes and that Mexico has not yet improved in other important areas such
as education and the protection of peasants against the effects of agricultural
imports from the US attest to its shortcomings.39 Had Mexico implemented
the necessary changes and reforms from day one, the country could be in a
better economic position today. Yet, NAFTA is an example of an RTA with
binding effect on future government leadership, which positively impacts
how investors see Mexico because of this strong commitment effect. As a
result, Mexico has captured more than double the amount of greenfield
investment projects than Brazil, as data from 2005 to 2015 shows.40
3.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI)
According to my theory, developing countries should promote a
balanced inflow of different types of FDI. Policy makers should aim for a
balance between investments that are seeking to access new markets
(horizontal FDI) and others taking advantage of host country’s comparative
advantage (vertical FDI). Before I can discuss how to promote inflow of the
correct mix of FDI, I should explain here the different types of FDI.
FDI can be horizontal or vertical. Horizontal FDI is when a firm
reproduces abroad the same business it operates domestically.41 In this case,
trade and investment are substitutes as the operation of the business abroad
37
Alfredo Cuevas et al., Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico Since the Approval of
NAFTA, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REV, 482 (2005). When the authors applied their estimation
to the Mexican data, they found that “factors not included in the regressions caused
exceedingly slow growth of FDI inflows in Mexico in the late 1990s.”.
38
Eric Gillman, Legal Transplants in Trade and Investment Agreements: Understanding
the Exportation of US Law to Latin America, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 263, 300 (2009). In this paper,
the authors emphasized the U.S.’s position when negotiating FTAs with Latin American
countries as rigid and demanding of the commitment to regulatory changes.
39
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 156.
40
Courtney Fingar, Mexico Foreign Direct Investment Races Ahead as Brazil Sputters,
FIN. TIMES, (August 25, 2015, 1:29 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/e938840a-4b13-11e5b5588a9722977189,Authorised=false.html?siteedition=intl&_i_location=http%3A%2F%2F
www.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F3%2Fe938840a-4b13-11e5-b5588a9722977189.html%3Fsiteedition%3Dintl&_i_referer=&classification=conditional_premiu
m&iab=barrier-app#axzz43Ol52vje. This article used data from the FDI Markets and the
Economist Intelligence Unit for the period from 2005 to 2015.
41
Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31, at 719, 726. The author explains the main
characteristics of vertical FDI (exploiting comparative advantage) and horizontal FDI (market
seeking).
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does not complement the domestic operation, therefore, the investors are
looking for access to a new market.42 This is the type of investment mostly
captured by Brazil because of its historically unchangeable implementation
of an import substitution economic strategy.43 On the other hand, vertical FDI
exploits comparative advantage as the investor identifies where the
investment abroad complements the firm’s domestic operation.44 The supplychain model, and a correlation between intra-firm trade and FDI inflow, is
the consequence of vertical FDI.45 Both vertical and horizontal investments
can be of the greenfield, or merger and acquisition (M&A) mode. It is
important to consider the difference between inflow of greenfield versus
M&A investment to better evaluate the importance of the country’s
regulatory environment to the promotion of inflow of FDI. Greenfield
investment is the establishment of a business abroad from the ground up.
M&A, or acquisition,46 is the acquisition of an existing business abroad.
The current global trade market is no longer rigidly defined by import
versus export interests, but by an interconnection of these interests, known
as the supply-chain model. Supply-chain requires trade facilitation, logistics,
and infrastructure such as border efficiency; all of which implicates more
investment from businesses and states. Businesses, as they increase
operational capital and investment in resources, know-how, and research
across borders are requiring more protection not only for tangible, but for
their intangible assets as well.47
Greenfield investments require a long-term commitment of capital since
the business is established from the ground up. This does not permit
immediate, or even short-term return on the capital invested. In this case, it
does not matter much if the investment is horizontal (as it is seeking access
to a new market) or vertical (which promotes inflow of FDI as a result of
intra-firm trade).48 Meanwhile, M&A requires lower sunk costs, as the
acquired business is already established, which allows for an expectation of
return on investment in a shorter period. In response to political uncertainties
and economic crisis, the M&A investor may have an incentive to sell the
investment, if possible, or at least reduce or suspend further inflow of capital,
Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31, at 719.
Santos, supra note 16, at 596, 598.
44
Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31, at 718-19.
45
Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31, at 727.
46
In this paper, the terms M&A and acquisition may be used interchangeably when
talking about the type of investment where the investor acquires a business already established
or expands an existing business but not enough to generate new business or create new a
market. When the expansion of operations is expressive enough to generate new businesses or
create new markets, it is considered a greenfield investment.
47
Richard Baldwin, WTO 2.0: Global Governance of Supply-Chain, CEPR POL’Y
INSIGHT, Dec. 2012, at 1. Baldwin focuses on the importance of property rights protections
but extending such to the protection of intangible assets such as technology and know-how;
id. at 9, 15.
48
Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31, at 727.
42

43
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depending mostly on the investment being horizontal or vertical.49 The
greenfield investor, on the other hand, has an interest in maintaining a certain
level of capital flow to avoid losing the investment altogether during the
economic crises.
One of the theories that explain an investor’s choice between greenfield
and M&A investment is the communication-based theory.50 This theory
establishes that the cost of communication is an important element to the
decision-making process by multinational enterprises (MNEs) when
deciding between greenfield or M&A investment in a foreign country.51
Verbal communication is key to successful parent-subsidiary
management, and there are four main reasons for such communication, (1)
the need to exchange knowledge, (2) “the coordination of activities, (3)
monitoring, and (4) socialization.”52 As expected, different languages
between parent and subsidiary increase the cost of communication and is
even higher in case of acquisition compared to greenfield investment.53
Hence, acquisition may present higher communication costs because it
requires more extensive parent-subsidiary communication due to the preestablishment of a business philosophy prior to the acquisition, which the
new parent needs to change in order to maintain a homogenous identity with
the new subsidiary. Although the key to understanding the investor’s
decision-making process, the communication-based theory does not consider
the other elements deliberated during the choice process.54 Some of the
elements that are also important are the regulatory environment and, to some
extent, the level of protection offered to foreign investments in the country
of destination.55
These other elements, not considered by the communication-based
theory, are extensively discussed under transaction costs and property rights
theories. In sum, the literature addresses the relationship between the host
state’s contracts and property rights law along with the strong institutions and
investments. Nobel Prize winner Douglass North argues that strong
institutions provide property rights protections that encourage investments,
which promotes production and organizational development, that leads to
economic growth.56
49
In the case of horizontal investment, if the crisis has a strong impact on the firm’s
market, it may be better to accept the loss and move altogether out of the market. Now in the
case of vertical investment, it will depend on the correlation between intra-firm trade and the
inflow of FDI. But in any case, a reduction of inflow of investment is expected.
50
Arjen H. L. Slangen, A Communication-Based Theory Choice Between Greenfield and
Acquisition Entry, 48 J. MGMT. STUD. 1699, 1719-21 (2011).
51
Id at 1719-21 (2011).
52
Id. at 1700.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 1721-22.
55
Id. at 1709-11.
56
Id.; see also DOUGLASS C. NORTH INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND
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In the particular case of an international joint venture (IJV), applying
the transaction cost theory to understand the reasons behind the formation of
IJVs in developing countries,57 the literature shows that in the majority of
IJVs the foreign partner brings the money and the domestic partner offers the
local knowledge and real estate.58 In this partnership, the risk is shared
between the foreign and the domestic partners. The IJV can be in either the
acquisition or greenfield investment mode; hereafter, the same arguments
presented above also apply to IJV. In M&A, the foreign partner will opt
between ending the partnership or reducing influx of capital in a time of
crisis.
One way of evaluating the success of regional trade agreements (RTAs)
is to consider the effects of intra-firm transactions in the country’s
economy.59 According to this economic theory, foreign-owned
manufacturing firms tend to concentrate trade with the country of origin of
their capital.60 A direct relationship also exists between the “weight of foreign
trade in relation to net earnings” and increases in a firm’s export to the
country of origin of capital.61 The theory indicates that to compensate for
trade diversion effects it is important to capture the investments that will
generate intra-firm transactions.62
The importance of identifying the elements considered by the investors
during the decision-making process of selecting between greenfield and
M&A lies in the welfare effect that each mode of FDI (greenfield vs.
acquisition) inflow promotes. Ben Ferrett developed an economic model that
allowed for the investigation of the interactions between greenfield and
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS (1990);
Douglass C. North, Institutions, Transaction Costs and Economic Growth, 25 ECON. INQUIRY
419 (July 1987); Gary D. Libecap, Douglass C. North: Transaction Costs, Property Rights,
and Economic Outcomes, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24585, May
2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24585.
57
See Bruce Kogut, Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, 9
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 319 (1988) (Kogut applies transaction cost and strategic behavior
theories to explain the motivation to joint venture). Pierre-Xavier Meschi, Government
Corruption and Foreign Stakes in International Joint Ventures in Emerging Economies, 26
ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 241 (2009) (Meschi isolates corruption as one of the causes of
environmental uncertainty and economic instability in his analysis of the survival of IJVs in
emerging Asian economies, under the light of transaction costs theory).
58
Id.; Kogut, supra note 57, at 327 (the author highlights the local legal knowledge as
well as the understanding of the local marketing as key incentives for the formation of an IJV).
59
Renato Baumann & Francisco Galrão Carneiro, Behaviour of Brazilian Export Firms:
Implications for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 78 CEPAL REV. 145 (2002).
60
Id. at 146.
61
Id. at 157.
62
Id. at 146. “Trade creation (emergence of new activities in the trade between the
participating countries) and trade diversion (reduction of imports of products offered by third
countries)”– are the two basic concepts the focus of most analysis of impact of trade. The
authors found that the evaluation of integration process shows beneficial results when intrafirm trade is considered.
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M&A foreign investment with other industry characteristics, such as
investment level in R&D.63 The results present strong indications that M&A
represents economic growth of the receiving country in the short run because
it results in higher prices and lower consumer welfare, while greenfield
investment increases consumer welfare and promotes stable economic
growth in the long run.64 Greenfield investment promotes market growth, and
even the establishment of new markets, which by definition is not promoted
under M&A. Such results emphasize the need for developing countries to
focus on balancing the inflow of greenfield investment with the inflow of
M&A, which requires governmental long-term commitment to regulatory
change in favor of a pro-market policy and strong property rights.65
Now that we have an understanding of the different types of FDI and an
overall view of the impact of each, I move to the discussion of NAFTA’s
provisions on treatment of foreign investment and investor-state dispute
settlement through international arbitration, along with its long-term binding
effect on future governments.
NAFTA AND MEXICO66
In light of the discussion above, it seems that NAFTA has presented the
necessary incentives to investors, increasing the inflow of greenfield
investment in Mexico’s manufacturing industry from over $3 million in 2005
to a little over $21 million in 2008.67 Even though NAFTA has been
renegotiated and a new deal has been signed (the USMCA), my discussion
will continue to focus on NAFTA since I am evaluating the impact of it up
to now. Still, it is important to address here some of the changes that are
introduced by the USMCA agreement once it enters into force.
First of all, the elimination of internal tariffs, with a few exceptions, is
still the main focus of USMCA as under NAFTA.68 The state-to-state dispute
4.

63

See Ben Ferrett, Greenfield Investment Versus Acquisition: Alternative Modes of
Foreign Expansion, (Univ. of Nottingham GEP Research Paper Series no. 39, 2005). This
model includes level of investment in R&D and number of firms as endogenous variables,
which allows for a more complex investigation of the interaction between greenfield and
acquisition FDI.
64
Id. at 14-15.
65
Libecap, supra note 56, in sum, weak property rights increase transaction costs, which
increases risk of investment.
66
Although NAFTA has been renegotiated and a new agreement (USMCA) will replace
the current NAFTA once it is ratified by all three members, the historical motivation of
NAFTA is still valid and important as it is still the agreement in force. Once USMCA enters
into force in many sectors, such as auto rules of origin and ISDS under NAFTA Chapter 11,
there is a phase in period of three years. Thus, NAFTA in many respects will control at least
until 2024 and longer if ratification is delayed.
67
Fingar, supra note 40, reporting greenfield investment in Mexico.
68

A copy of the signed USMCA document is available at https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreementbetween, (link last visited on September 18, 2019). The USMCA did not deviate from the
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settlement mechanism69 has not been significantly altered, even though it is
faulty because it allows the defendant state to stonewall the panel
appointment process indefinitely.70 The investor-state dispute settlement
mechanism (ISDS) suffered major alterations. In reality, ISDS is no longer
available for foreign investors in Canada or the United States;71 however,
ISDS access for U.S. investors in Mexico will exist, although considerably
limited, except for a few key sectors such as hydrocarbons, power,
telecommunications, and certain infrastructure.72 The impact of the new
agreement and its significant lessening in investors’ protection may have an
impact on future investment, but it is not the point of this paper, which
concentrates on the results of NAFTA, from its establishment to now.
Mexico’s motivations to join NAFTA were primarily economic in
nature73. Mexico wanted to expand employment and exports through the
maquiladora program or otherwise stimulate job growth and technology
transfer, mitigate the impact of the 1982 financial crisis through trade
liberalization,74 and increase the inflow of FDI.75 It followed the economic
theory that boosting productivity growth—increasing total factor
productivity (TFP)76—promotes growth in GDP per worker, boosting
economic growth.77
Also, Mexico had already initiated economic reform towards
liberalization beginning in 1985, including but not limited to joining the

main principle of freer trade between the three members.
69
See NAFTA chapter 20, and USMCA chapter 31.
70
Sergio Puig, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: A Glimpse into the
Geoeconomic World Order, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 56, 57 (2019); David Gantz, United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement: Settlement of Disputes 6 (Ariz. Legal Stud. Discussion
Paper No. 19-08, 2019) [hereinafter Gantz, United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement].
71
As for Canadian investors in Mexico and vice-versa, the protection would be under the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership art. 9, Mar. 8, 2018,
https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
agr-acc/cptpp-ptpgp/text-texte/cptpp-ptpgp.aspx?lang=eng.
72
ISDS is found under NAFTA chapter 11 and USMCA chapter 14. I am not going to
discuss the details of the changes from NAFTA to USMCA because this paper focuses on the
impact of NAFTA from its creation to now, and USMCA enters into force in 2020. See
generally John S. Baker & Lindsey Keiser, NAFTA/USMCA Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
and the Constitution, 50 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 2 (2019); Puig, supra note 70; Gantz,
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, supra note 70.
73
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENT, supra note 15, at 108.
74
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS. NAFTA is still in force, which is the reason
why the discussion here focuses on it even though USMCA will also be discussed here.
75
Waldkirch, New Regionalism, supra note 33, at 152.
76
According to Business Dictionary, TFP measures the efficiency of all inputs to a
production process. TFP growth represents a part of the output not explained by the input used
in production, usually from technological innovation or improvements.
77
Levine, supra note 36, at 689.
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).78 President Salinas
understood the importance of the pressure from treaty obligations to promote
necessary internal reforms. NAFTA was seen by Mexico’s federal
government as a security blanket that would impede future governments from
returning to protectionist policies without breaching international
obligations, truly embracing the open market philosophy.79
At the time of NAFTA negotiations, the Uruguay Round was stalled and
the political significance of this agreement to the three states was such that
many items not yet implemented under WTO were incorporated into the
agreement. NAFTA incorporated rules on foreign investment protections,
trade in services, technical standards, sanitary and phytosanitary standards,
intellectual property, government procurement, and investor-state dispute
settlement provisions, to cite a few.80 Because of its all-inclusive
characteristic, NAFTA became the model Free Trade Agreement (FTA) for
all three members and influenced other countries’ FTA models as well.
Even though NAFTA has no provisions for harmonization of laws, with
the exception of Chapter 5 on harmonization of customs regulatory
procedures,81 it has permitted the transplanting of U.S. laws into the Mexican
legal system as Mexico introduced new laws and regulations implementing
trade liberalization.82 NAFTA has assured foreign investors of Mexico’s
commitment to reform; one example is the relaxation of rules on foreign
ownership, which now allows for majority foreign ownership in Mexico.83
The literature also credits the increase of FDI inflow into Mexico to
NAFTA’s binding effect, to its duty-free treatment of most imports from
Mexico into the United States, and to Mexico’s geographical proximity to
the United States and Canada.84 It is estimated that FDI inflows in Mexico in
the second half of the 1990s were about sixty percent higher than they would
have been without NAFTA.85
78
Ivan T. Kandilov & Ash Leblebicioglu, Trade Liberalization and Investment: Firmlevel Evidence from Mexico, 26 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 320, 321, 323-24 (2012) (using
data from 1984 to 1990, the authors wanted to evaluate the impact of the trade liberalization
program launched in 1995. They found “that the decrease in input tariffs, as well as import
license coverage, resulted in higher investment in Mexican manufacturing establishments”).
79
Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31, at 710-711.
80
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 105.
81
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 115. Chapter 5 of NAFTA
establishes the steps to be followed by an importer to acquire a NAFTA Certificate of Origin,
which require a great deal of cooperation and coordination among the three members’ customs
services.
82
See Gillman, supra note 38.
83
Waldkirch, Effects, supra note 31, at 715.
84
Gillman, supra note 38, at 265; Waldkirch, New Regionalism, supra note 30, at 154,
175.
85
Cuevas et al., supra note 37, at 473, 482. Demonstrating a study where the authors used
a panel model to estimate total net inflows of FDI into a country considering indicators of
macroeconomic stability and direct measure of globalization process. They concluded that
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The major deregulation in the Mexican Foreign Investment Law has
been the relaxation of Mexican rules restricting foreign ownership of
enterprises in Mexico, which earlier limited foreign capital participation and
control to forty-nine percent, but today is no longer applicable for
investments of less than $150 million.86 The Foreign Investment Law of
1993, which allows foreign investors to control up to 100% of a Mexican
enterprise, also prohibited foreign investors’ access to some activities that
had been reserved exclusively to the Mexican Government and/or to Mexican
citizens.87 Mexico’s ranking on the “Ease of Doing Business” indicator88
from the 2011-2015 period compared to the 2006-2010 period had improved
on a steady pace (from 43 to 38), contrary to Brazil’s ranking, which had
worsened across the same periods (from 111 to 116).89
The more stringent requirements imposed by NAFTA provisions on
technical standards, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, intellectual
property, and ISDS have increased the competitiveness of Mexican
industry.90 This is especially true when compared with Brazilian industry,
which is inefficient and not competitive since it depends on state subsidies
and protectionist regulations, including but not limited to high protective
tariffs.91 In any event, it is undeniable that Mexico’s commitment to open
markets, reflected in unilateral reductions of applied tariffs in recent years to
about five to six percent92, and the implementation of changes to its legal
FDI was sixty percent higher as a result of “NAFTA-induced exports”); Waldkirch, New
Regionalism, supra note 33, at 168 (explaining that the Waldkirch estimation has quite similar
results, as it concluded that FDI in Mexico would be below forty-two percent without
NAFTA).
86
Michael W. Goldman et al., An Introduction to Direct Foreign Investment in Mexico, 5
IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 101, 111-13 (1994); Jorge A. Vargas, Mexico’s Foreign
Investment Act of 1993, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 907, 927 (1994).
87
The foreign participation in regulated activities is limited to certain percentages varying
between 10%, 25%, and 49%, according to article 7 of FIL 1993. Goldman et al., supra note
76, at 115-16, 118-19 (presenting a detailed analysis of the evolution of Foreign Investment
Law in Mexico); Vargas, supra note 86, at 912, 926, 936-37.
88
The “ease of doing business” is an indicator developed by the World Bank that ranks
economies based on their regulatory environment. The World Bank provides details on the
elements evaluated by this indicator and a complete ranking list. Ease of Doing Business Index
(Most Business-Friendly Regulations), WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
IC.BUS.EASE.XQ (last visited March 17, 2021) [hereinafter World Bank Index].
89
R. Shyam Khemani & Ana Carrasco-Martin, The Investment Climate, Competition
Policy, and Economic Development in Latin America, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 67 (2008);
World Bank Index, supra note 88 (indicating that the rankings for the periods above were
collected from the “ease of doing business”).
90
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 105.
91
Canuto and Reis, supra note 29, at 8; Rafael A. Porrata-Doria Jr., MERCOSUR: The
Common Market of the Twenty-First Century?, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2004),
throughout the paper, Porrata-Doria discusses Brazil’s protectionist measures and tariffs
92
David A. Gantz, The Risks and Rewards of Renegotiating the North American Trade
Relationship, 33 MD. J. INT'l L. 127-161, 149 (2018). Gantz, Regional Trade Agreements,
supra note 15, at 112.
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system93 are the key difference between Brazilian and Mexican policy
strategies.
Simple observation of data collected in the late 1990s gives a false
impression that NAFTA did not impact Mexico’s FDI inflow when it is
compared to FDI inflow to other Latin American Countries.94 However,
applying a flexible statistic model, Monge-Naranjo was able to confirm that
NAFTA did indeed help Mexico attract more FDI than its neighbors.95 These
findings are confirmed by another study using empirical data and regression
model research, which demonstrated an increase in investments in Mexico,
more from partners—the United States and Canada—but also from other
countries, as an effect of NAFTA.96
Mexico suffered some setbacks in the first year of NAFTA that are
credited with lessening the positive effects expected from the agreement.97
The uprising of southern states unhappy with alleged special attention offered
to the northern states, the assassination of presidential candidate Luis
Colosio, the uprisings in Chiapas, and the peso crisis beginning in December
199498 scared some of the investors who were afraid of the political and
economic repercussions of these issues.99 Mexico’s industry also lost some
enterprises because of lower manufacturing costs in China, but the country
was able to recover because of Mexico’s strong commitment to trade
liberalization and global competition through efficient industrialization.100
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 156.
Alexander Monge-Naranjo, The Impact of NAFTA on Foreign Direct Investment Flows
in Mexico and the Excluded Countries, NW. UNIV. (2002), http://ctrc.sice.oas.org/geograph/
north/monge.pdf; Rene Cabral et al., Capital and Labour Mobility and Their Impact on
Mexico’s Regional Labour Market, 46 J. DEV. STUD. 1523, 1523-42 (2010).
95
Id. Monge-Naranjo explains that the model is a flexible one because it excludes the FDI
from privatization. In the late 1990s, many Latin American countries, including Brazil, had
captured FDI by privatizing oil, energy, mining, and other sectors that were controlled by the
government. As investment captured by privatization is not in competition with investment
fomented by NAFTA, the flexible model allows for a better evaluation and assessment of the
impact of NAFTA in Mexico’s FDI inflow.
96
Cabral et al., supra note 94; Waldkirch, New Regionalism, supra note 33. Waldkirch
clarifies that Mexico was leading in FDI inflow until Brazil started its privatization process,
which brought most Acquisition-FDI into Brazil.
97
Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., NAFTA at 20: Misleading Charges and Positive
Achievements, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (May 2014), http://www.piie.com/
publications/pb/pb14-13.pdf; Cuevas et al., supra note 37. The authors speculate that a hold
on privatization in Mexico was one of the explanations.
98
Cuevas et al., supra note 37. Also known as the Tequila crisis, the peso crisis may have
had a lesser negative weight as it reduced the cost of production in Mexico. However, it still
explains the lukewarm performance.
99
Hufbauer et al., supra note 97.
100
Id.; Two Ways to Make a Car, THE ECONOMIST, (Mar. 10, 2012),
http://www.economist.com/node/21549950/print. It is also important to remember here that
cost of labor in China had increased and some business that had gone to China are returning
to the NAFTA bloc. Still, Vietnam and India are viable competitors for the labor-intensive
industry that is moving from China.
93

94
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NAFTA has positively impacted Mexico, especially because of the
incorporation of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, which
demonstrated Mexico’s commitment to a “pro-international law” policy.101
Nonetheless, it is the domestic implementation of the necessary pro-trade
environment through regulatory reforms that had bolstered and solidified the
effect and impact of the economic integration agreement.102
The disputes brought by investors before various international
arbitration bodies, under NAFTA Chapter 11, tested the binding effect of the
dispute settlement provisions and the limitations imposed to the Mexican
government by the obligations assumed under the agreement.103 Foreign
investment and arbitration laws can be considered “global administrative
law,”104 even though they are not uniform, because of the powerful influence
exerted by them within governmental agencies.105 These “laws” limit the
agencies and judiciary power to implement protectionist rules, offering the
necessary protection to foreign investors.106
Many of the commitments assumed by Mexico had not been followed
by the necessary public policy reforms at the proper speed. If Mexico had
promoted the development of infrastructure and logistics, along with reforms
in labor laws, education policies, and the development of agricultural labor
affected by NAFTA (corn imported from the United States instead of
domestically produced displaced unskilled labor), it would be a more
competitive country today, less dependent on the existence of NAFTA.107 It
is important to mention here that Mexico promoted the implementation of
key reforms in 2013, which were ignited by the “Pacto por Mexico,”108 and
included the reforms of the education and energy sectors.109
101
Claus von Wobeser, Mexico, in LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT PROTECTIONS:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON LAWS, TREATIES, AND DISPUTES FOR INVESTORS, STATE, AND
COUNSEL 361 (Jonathan C. Hamilton et al. eds., 2012).
102
Monge-Naranjo, supra note 94. By comparing the increase in FDI in Mexico (under
NAFTA) and Costa Rica (under the Caribbean Basin Initiative), Monge-Naranjo found that
just an agreement is not enough to increase FDI. This was concluded because Costa Rica
benefited the most from CBI since it implemented the necessary regulatory reforms.
103
Monge-Naranjo, supra note 94.
104
Here, I use such comparison to facilitate the understanding of the impact of ISDS in
curtailing domestic protectionist rules. However, I do not ascribe to the new line of study that
recommends that international law, especially WTO dispute settlement, be enforced under the
full lenses of administrative law.
105
Javier Robalino-Orellana, International Investment and Administrative Law in Latin
America, 101 AM. SOCY. INTL. L. PROC. 465 (2007).
106
Id.
107
Cuevas et al., supra note 37.
108
Pacto por Mexico is a political document signed by then-President of Mexico Pena
Nieto, the President of the National Action Party, the Chair of the Institutional Revolutionary
Party, the Chair of the Party of Democratic Revolution, the party of the current President, and
the Green Party of Mexico. The pact framed Mexico’s public policy proposals including
education and energy reforms.
109
For an evaluation of the Pacto por Mexico, I recommend Mark Weisbrot, et al., El
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The reform of the energy sector was designed to open a sector where
both domestic and foreign private investment were traditionally barred by the
Mexican Constitution, eventually allowing for foreign investment in the
energy sector, which should become a major driver of Mexico’s economic
growth.110 The Mexican Constitution was amended and the Energy Reform
Plan was signed into law in December 2013 by President Pena Nieto.111
These reforms have brought much excitement among investors; however, the
convoluted regulatory framework could be holding back the development of
most of the projects. The question now is if President Lopez-Obrador will
support the reforms as they have been orchestrated by his predecessor. A
possible hindrance could be the return of nationalism to Mexico’s public
policy, which was the candidacy promise of Mr. Lopez-Obrador, in line with
the new Moreno Party (formerly with the leftist Party of the Democratic
Revolution (“PRD”)). It is worth mentioning here that in the sectors of oil
and gas, energy power, transportation, telecommunications, and some
infrastructure, protection for foreign investment under USMCA was not
eliminated, but it has been limited to contracts signed with the Mexican
government. Such protection may be an indication that President Obrador
may follow the Energy Reform Plan. 112
Furthermore, Mexico’s reforms in investment law and secured
transactions law, among other regulatory reforms, have opened the door to
greenfield investment, which is a long-term investment. Even without ISDS
protections and enforceable labor protections under USMCA, if Mexico does
not panic and adversely react, one can expect that it should be able to retain
most of the manufacturing industries already established there. due to the
costs of disinvestment and the many other factors that made Mexico an
important destination for U.S. manufacturing, including its proximity to the
United States, low wage costs,113 and a twenty-five-year history of friendly
Pacto por México Después de Cinco Acinco ños: ¿Cómo le ha ido?, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y
RES. (June 2018), http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/mexico-spn-2018-06.pdf.
110
José Ramón Cossío Díaz & José Ramón Cossío Barragán, The New Energy System in
the Mexican Constitution, in THE RULE OF THE LAW AND MEXICO’S ENERGY REFORM, JAMES
A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY (2017).
111
Decreto por el que se Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Constitución
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en Materia de Energía [Decree that Amends
Provisions of Mexico’s Constitution Concerning Energy], published at the DIARIO
OFICIAL DE LA FEDERACIÓN (Dec. 20, 2013), available at http://
www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/ref/dof/CPEUM_ref_212_20dic13.pdf.
112
See Baker & Keiser, supra note 72; North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.Mex.-U.S., ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993); United States-Mexico-Canada
Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 14, Annex, 14-D, Annex 14-E, Nov. 30, 2018,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/14-Investment.pdf.
113
Even though USMCA added enforceable labor protections under chapter 25, and the
“rapid response labor mechanism” under chapter 31, there has been criticism that these
measures are not strong enough to make an expressive impact on cost of labor. However, as
the USMCA is not the focus of this paper here, I refrain from assuming any strong position of
the future cost of wages.
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government policies, among others.
Under the USMCA, a few provisions have suffered extensive
modifications.114 NAFTA Chapter 11 dispute mechanism has been
eliminated between the United States and Canada, and has been limited for
use between Mexico and the United States, as I have mentioned above. As
for the Rules of Origin and Regional Value content, although the United
States wanted to bring the minimum North American content up from 62.5%
to 85%, a compromise was reached at 75%.115
Another key issue for the United States was the low labor wages in
Mexico; USMCA addresses this by requiring that 40% of auto and 45% of
small truck content must be made by workers making at least $16.00 per hour
(for the most part only obtainable in the United States and Canada). Another
important change is the introduction of the Sunset Clause stating that the
agreement ends in 16 years unless the parties agree to extend it.116 USMCA
also requires Mexico to implement legislation that permits independent
unions with full collective-bargaining powers, up to now a rarity in Mexican
unions.117
The impact and general success of this new agreement once it enters
into force depend in significant part on Mexico’s implementation of the still
necessary reforms, which should allow for some independence from its
partners, the United States and Canada. Mexico has the potential to capture
more investment from other countries and regions. According to data for the
first quarter of 2019, from Statista.com,118 Mexican inflow of FDI from
NAFTA members was at 48%, of which only 5% was from Canada. The
second biggest investor in Mexico is Spain (13.8%), trailed by Belgium
(6.9%) and the Netherlands (5.2%).119 Spain and Belgium are already
investing at higher levels than Canada, but the NAFTA members are still
responsible for almost 50% of all the FDI in Mexico.120
As I mentioned before, Brazil opened its market around the same time
114
See supra text accompanying note 72; see also GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS,
supra note 15, at 144. The author shows that the initial proposal from the United States would
allow the state to opt out of the ISDS altogether. Instead, a categorization of the process is the
final product.
115
See generally Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican
States, and Canada, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 4, Nov. 30, 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/04%20Rules%20of%20Origin.pdf.
116
USMCA, Article 34.7 of final provisions, Full text provided by the US Trade
Representative at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/34_
Final_Provisions.pdf.
117
See USMCA, annex 23-A.
118
Distribution of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Mexico in 3rd quarter 2019, by
Country of Origin, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/709875/fdi-mexico-origin/
(last visited Novermber 24, 2019). The data presented here is from Statista.com and refers to
the 1st quarter of 2019.
119
Id
120
Id.
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as Mexico but adopted a different policy, a more protectionist policy.
MERCOSUR was signed with the promise of an integration between its
South American members and a movement towards a freer market.121 Next,
I evaluate the MERCOSUR and its impact in Brazil.

5.

MERCOSUR AND BRAZIL
MERCOSUR has suffered many setbacks during its twenty-five plus
years of existence. The impeachment of Brazil’s President in 1992, the
Argentine great depression and devaluation in 1998, and the global financial
crisis of 2008 are some of the developments that retarded the success of
MERCOSUR.122 Despite the setbacks, it is necessary to recognize that the
commerce within the bloc had increased, along with the fact that Brazil,
Argentina, and Uruguay had opened key markets to private investors through
privatization of state-owned enterprises.123 However, in the long run, it is
evident that MERCOSUR members, especially Brazil, have not fully
embraced more open markets and liberalization of trade.124 They rushed into
an ambitious agreement that required domestic commitment to implement,
even if gradually, the adoption of open market policies and coordination of
macroeconomic policies among the members.125 Such coordination involves
trust, political, social, and economic synchronization among the members for
the domestic implementation of trade liberalization, especially when
implementing policies addressing the effects of external shocks.
To better understand its impact on Brazil’s economic growth, I evaluate
the MERCOSUR under four categories identified as key to understanding
why it never succeeded in becoming the expected powerful bloc of the
Southern Cone. First, based on Buchanan et al., finding that “institutional
quality has a positive and significant effect on FDI,”126 I evaluate the strength
of the institutions established under the MERCOSUR. Second, I review the
Santos, supra note 16, at 555.
José Manuel Quijano, MERCOSUR: ¿el relanzamiento?, 199 NUEVA SOCIEDAD 53, 5358 (2005). The author analyzed the major economic issues that affected the bloc and its
member in his study of MERCOSUR from 1986 through 2005. The paper pinpoints the major
economic policies adopted by each member and how it impacted the bloc.
123
Id. Here Quinjano mentions that from 1990 to 1999 there was an important movement
for denationalization of state-owned enterprises with Argentina leading the bloc, while Brazil
and Uruguay’s efforts towards privatization were more timid.
124
Santos, supra note 16, at 600.
125
Paulo Roberto Almeida, Uma Historia do MERCOSUR do Nascimento à Crise, 191
REVISTA ESPAÇO ACADÊMICO 106 (2011). Paulo Roberto is a Brazilian diplomat and professor
of Political Economy in Brazil. In this article, the author discusses the many issues that have
weakened the bloc along its lifetime.
126
Buchanan et al, supra note 25. The authors’ regression model examined the relationship
between institutional quality and volatility of FDI and found an inverse relationship between
volatility of FDI and institutional quality.
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lack of harmonization of macroeconomic policy among its members; third, I
assess the efforts, if any, to implement the necessary harmonization of law
within the bloc; and finally, fourth, I discuss the members’ commitment to
trade liberalization and the existence, or not, of binding and enforceable
commitments within the provisions of the MERCOSUR agreement.
A. Failure to Establish Strong Institutions under MERCOSUR
The MERCOSUR bloc was a response to the establishment of the
European Union (E.U.) and NAFTA. The adoption of more open trade
policies worldwide, combined with Brazil’s desire to establish itself as a
powerful political as well as economic leader in South America, and the
lacuna left by the decline of the United States’ influence in the region, was
the breeding ground for the formation of the bloc.127 All four initial members
– Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay – benefited from a similar
political momentum as new democracies willing to take part in the economic
liberalization movement that was taking place in the world.128 The members
had participated in previous, less ambitious endeavors towards trade
liberalization under the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in
1960, later replaced by the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI
in Spanish), and had established limited cooperation among themselves in
the past.129 However, the MERCOSUR was a plan too ambitious for the
existing infrastructure, which was not strong enough to support an effective
planning and implementation of the MERCOSUR. Weak infrastructure, as
well as the members’ unwillingness to effectively implement the necessary
institutions, lead to the bloc’s failure.
Mattli offers an analytical framework that was adopted by Hummel and
Lohaus in the analysis of the MERCOSUR.130 According to Mattli’s
model131, the strength of the institutions impacts the success of the regional
agreement as it can offset the risks brought by the uncertainty of the behavior
of each member. The Treaty of Asuncion132 created a basic but complex
structure that required a series of treaties and protocols for its
implementation.133 The structure was inspired by the E.U.; however, the
members of MERCOSUR did not have the same commitment to the rule of
127
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15; Felix Hummel & Mathis
Lohaus, MERCOSUR: Integration through Presidents and Paymasters, in ROADS TO
REGIONALISM: GENESIS, DESIGN AND EFFECTS OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATION 59 (Tanja A.
Borzel et. al. ed., 2012).
128
Porrata-Doria Jr., supra note 91; Gabriel Gari, Regional Integration: Comparative
Experiences: Free Circulation of Services in MERCOSUR: A Pending Task, 10 LAW & BUS.
REV. AM. 545 (2004).
129
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 368.
130
Hummel & Lohaus, supra note 127, at 59-77.
131
Id., at 60.
132
The Treaty of Asuncion, signed on March 26, 1991, established the MERCOSUR.
133
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 368.
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law or to the implementation and development of the bloc as the European
states had and still have. The institutions under MERCOSUR have never had
the same independence, power, and degree of commitment as the ones within
the E.U.134
Many of the protocols that created important institutions have not
entered into force because the members have not ratified them, or they have
not been implemented because they require domestic regulatory reform by
each member, and such reforms have not yet been adopted.135 Also, the
decisions, norms, and protocols that entered into force are not always
executed at the domestic level because the institutions established within the
MERCOSUR do not have the power to monitor and enforce the domestic
execution of the regulations approved by the bloc.136 Although the
MERCOSUR regulations are supposed to be binding, the need for ratification
and the absence of efficient monitoring and enforcement remedies permit the
members to defect as they please.
Weak institutions give emphasis to Presidential diplomacy as the
liberalization process requires constant participation and influence at the
presidential level to be successful.137 The presidents, especially of Argentina
and Brazil, set the agenda, define the foreign policy, and, most importantly,
set the focus of the MERCOSUR.138 The development of the bloc is strongly
dependent on each member’s domestic agenda and its changes or stalls, as
new governments are elected, which is aggravated also by the fact that the
members are not in sync when it comes to their diplomatic policies.139
Furthermore, the bloc does not cultivate a strong strategic agenda with longterm planning and incentives for implementation of approved measures.140
B. Lack of Harmonization of Macroeconomic Policies
MERCOSUR has its merits as the state members went from “restricted
trade to a practically free-trade area[,]”141 but it could have achieved broader
134
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 365-92. The author presents
the structure of MERCOSUR, and not much has changed since the book’s publication. For a
complete updated organogram with detailed information on each institution established under
the MERCOSUR and their respective functions and attributions, visit the MERCOSUR page
available at https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/institucional/organograma-mercosul/ (last visited
January 28, 2019).
135
For a complete list of the protocols, norms, and agreements signed under the
MERCOSUR along with their status visit http://www.mre.gov.py/tratados/public_web/
ConsultaMercosur.aspx (last visited January 28, 2019).
136
Id.
137
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15.
138
Mario E. Carranza, Can Mercosur Survive? Domestic and International Constraints on
Mercosur, Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 45, No. 2, 67-103, (Summer, 2003),
139
Id at 75.
140
Id at 69.
141
Paulo Paiva & Ricardo Gazel, MERCOSUR: Past, Present, and Future, 13 NOVA
ECONOMIA BELO HORIZONTE 115, (2003).
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importance and a leading role in bringing South America into the globalized
trade market. Instead of embracing open trade as the bloc public policy, the
countries’ economies are dependent on state subsidies and protection of
selected industries through high tariffs, as economists call it industrialization
by import substitution, with the state as the main investor in domestic
production, all of which reduces imports.142 Such policy results in an in
efficient and non-competitive industry that is easily swayed by domestic and
international economic fluctuations.143
From 1997 to around 2002, the financial world experienced the Asian
financial crisis, the default by Russia on its debts, the devaluation of the
Brazilian currency, and the Argentine economic crisis.144 Brazil and the other
members of MERCOSUR reestablished trade barriers to protect their own
industries.145 The bloc did not present any effort to coordinate a united
response to the issues.146 The uncoordinated response to the external crises
and unilateral implementation of protectionist policies damaged the bloc’
credibility among members, outside partners, and international lenders and
investors.147 It confirmed to the world that the MERCOSUR members lacked
commitment to open market policies, to the integration process, and to the
success of MERCOSUR as a regional trade bloc.148
Brazil has pursued an import substitution policy since the end of the
Second World War as a strategy to grow selected key industries.149 At that
time, the strategy favored the establishment of Brazil’s industry with foreign
capital because there was no “know-how” and there were no proper funding
opportunities to help domestic firms grow or to help nationals acquire
capital.150 The result was an artificially induced industrialization dependent
on foreign and government-funded capital.151 In the past, import substitution
promoted rapid growth, which was not, and still is not, sustainable in the long
run as it does not increase real income and consumption. Meanwhile, it
increases potential future liability due to capital flight risk.152 Under such a
142

Id.
Id.
144
Carranza, supra note 138, at 69-71.
145
Paiva & Gazel, supra note 141 at 127.
146
Porrata-Doria, supra note 91; Hummel & Lohaus, supra note 127.
147
Graphic 1 shows how unstable is the inflow of FDI in Brazil. Also, it has already been
demonstrated that the members of the bloc do not coordinate their public policies, Finally, the
multidisciplinary literature presented emphasize the importance of institutional credibility for
the promotion of FDI inflow. All supporting this author’s assumption.
148
As I said here before, it is not BITs that promote FDI, but the RTAs that do promote
FDI. However, it still requires domestic commitment to the terms of the RTA.
149
Samuel A. Morley & Gordon W. Smith, Import Substitution and Foreign Investment in
Brazil, 23 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 120, 135 (1971).
150
Id. at 130.
151
Id. at 131.
152
Id. at 132 (in this study, Morley & Smith emphasized the lack of commitment from
foreign investors and how fast they would take away their investments at the first sign of
143

164

Forget BIT
41:139 (2021)

policy, with tariffs protecting the domestic industry, local goods are more
expensive and, more often than not, they are of low quality when compared
to the competing goods offered in the world market.
During the 2003-2017 period, the bloc experienced a sharp shift in its
trade policy as left-wing governments were established in the region. Under
the guidance of Mr. Lula in Brazil, and Mr. Kirchner in Argentina,
MERCOSUR lost its focus on trade.153 Lula and Kirchner marked the
relaunch of MERCOSUR with a new agenda. A new dimension for
integration within the bloc was introduced, with the focus moving from open
international economic trade policy to a social-political policy.154 Starting in
the earlier 2000s, the MERCOSUR was used as a tool for political regime
integration, moving away from its foundational purpose.155 The suspension
of Paraguay and the accession of Venezuela in 2012 (since suspended) was
a series of political maneuvers to consolidate the new purpose of the bloc.156
The suspension of Paraguay was the bloc’s response to the impeachment of
its left-wing president in 2012, and permitted the admission of Venezuela as
a full member on that same year, which had been blocked by Paraguay.157
This maneuver was the formalization of MERCOSUR’s divorce from its
initial goal of integration through free trade of goods and services. Proffessor
Porrata-Doria, in his reevaluation of the MERCOSUR, emphasized that the
accession of Venezuela changed the focus of the bloc since the idea of
integration under the late president, Hugo Chavez, was “incompatible with .
. . open markets and free trade,”158 which has remained the case under Mr.
Maduro.
New unilateral policies amplifying the negative effects of the 2007political instability).
153
Mariana Vazques & Jose Briceno Ruiz, O Mercosul na Epoca de Lula e Kirchner: Um
Balanco, Seis Anos Depois, NUEVA SOCIEDAD 33, 48 (2009). The authors applaud the new
multidimensional approach of MERCOSUR integration; however, they do not consider the
economic implications of such a change in focus.
154
Id.
155
Porrata-Doria, supra note 91.
156
Guilherme Frizzera, A Suspensao do Paraguai no Mercosul: Problema Interno,
Solucao Externa, 2 CONJUNTURA GLOBAL 156, 164 (2003).
157
Venezuela had not been fully admitted before because Paraguay would not ratify the
country’s accession, and with the suspension of Paraguay, its ratification became unnecessary.
Brazil’s push for Paraguay’s suspension has been seen as a political maneuver to facilitate that
accession of Venezuela since Paraguay was not willing to ratify Venezuela’s accession. See
Mercosur Suspends Paraguay over Lugo Impeachment, BBC (June 29, 2012),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-18636201; Paraguay Suspended from
MERCOSUR, THE GUARDIAN (June 29, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2012/jun/30/paraguay-suspended-mercosur; Guido Nejamkis & Ana Flor, Mercosur
welcomes Venezuela, suspends Paraguay, REUTERS (June 29, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-MERCOSUR-idUSBRE85S1JT20120630.
158
Rafael A. Porrata-Doria Jr., MERCOSUR at Twenty: From Adolescence to Adulthood?,
27 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1 (2013).
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2009 economic crisis affecting the region were implemented.159 As could
have been anticipated, such policies produced distortions to the economic
relationship among the members and with foreign investors, once more
negatively impacting economic integration and economic growth in the
region and solidifying MERCOSUR and Brazil’s economic irrelevance in the
global marketplace.160
The aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, which started in the
United States and spread quickly because of globalized trade and financial
markets, did not spare the Latin American countries.161 Although the problem
deserves a more in depth analysis not offered here, it is fair to say that the
slowdown in China’s investments in South American countries’
infrastructure, along with the relationship between China’s exports and South
American imports and exports (particularly Argentinian and Brazilian soy
exports and Brazilian iron ore exports) have contributed to the still-lingering
effects experienced by Brazil and Argentina.162 Without fully returning to
closed trade market models, many countries had adopted some protectionist
measures to safeguard key industries and export sectors.163 Such measures
were often labeled as “stimulus packages.”164 But they were protectionist,
nevertheless.
Brazil adopted stimulus packages to “improve energy and transportation
services, support social and urban housing projects.”165 However, recent
criminal investigations conducted in Brazil166 have indicated that much of
this money was illegally diverted into the pockets of various government
officials.167 Such political crises, combined with the lack of commitment to
open market policies, may be further exacerbating the devastating
consequences of the most recent economic crisis experienced by Brazil.
Hummel & Lohaus, supra note 127; Carranza, supra note 138; Paiva, & Gazel supra
note 141.
160
Gabriel V. Montes-Rojas, A Note to Building a Counterfactual for MERCOSUR, 15
LATIN AM. BUS. REV. 315 (2014).
161
Padideh Ala’I, The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Trade and Investment, 104 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 447 (2010).
162
Under “leftist” governments, Brazil’s and Argentina’s high spending during the boom
period of China’s investment is prolonging even more the effects of China’s slowdown.
163
Quijano, supra note 122.
164
Ala’I, supra note 161, at 448.
165
Id., at 449.
166
The “carwash operation” (Operacao Lava-Jato) was launched in 2006 to investigate
alleged involvement of a former Congress representative in money laundering. By 2013, many
members of the President’s party and officers of the high government were indicted or under
investigation. The investigation has indictments all the way up to both Presidents from the
Worker’s Party, Mr. Lula and Mrs. Dilma Rousseff.
167
In April 2016, Ms. Dilma Rousseff was the second President of Brazil to be impeached.
Now, not only Ms. Rousseff but many of her allies, cabinet members, and associates, are still
being investigated for corruption during her government as well as during the tenure of
previous president, Mr. Lula da Silva. President Lula was jailed from April 2018 until
November 2019. He is still answering to many criminal charges brought against him.
159
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The political turmoil being experienced by South American countries,
focusing here on Brazil and Argentina, is slowing the process for social and
economic recovery168. The slow recovery of these two economies is
negatively impacting Paraguay, Uruguay, and the other members of the
MERCOSUR.169 Brazilian President Bolsonaro is trying to stimulate the
economy by reducing expenditures, easing up financial and commercial
regulations, and reducing bureaucracy.170 Many of the proposed reforms aim
at moving Brazil up in the World Bank Ease of Doing Business ranking.171
Argentina seems to be moving towards a different track. After losing the
August primary, President Mauricio Macri tried adopting more Peronist
policies in an effort to win elections against the leaders of the opposition, Mr.
Alberto Fernandez, and his vice president, Ms. Cristina Kirchner. However,
Macri lost the elections and, as President, Mr. Fernandez is bringing
Argentina back to Peronism.172
C. Harmonization of Laws
MERCOSUR’s ultimate success as a mechanism for economic
integration and economic development throughout the region requires the
standardization of regulations and efficacious implementation of its law.173
Many decisions, resolutions, and protocols have been approved by the
members with definitions and regulations to guide the market participants in
a more interventionist fashion, which is in line with civil law tradition.174
However, the success of this approach requires strong institutions with the
necessary power to monitor and enforce the domestic implementation of
168
Here I am referring to the popular revolt in Venezuela; the popular manifestation of
dissatisfaction with the left-wing governments that plagued Brazil; the effects of the “carwash
operation,” which led to the prison of Mr. da Silva, the bustling elections in Brazil (which
elected President Bolsonaro under the promises of end of corruption and economic reforms,
and the Argentinean economic crisis that influence the election of the center-left opposition
candidate Mr. Alberto Fernández.
169
Carranza, supra note 138 at 75, 76 (the impact of Brazilian crisis in the other members),
at 82 and 83 (the dependency of the other members on Brazil and Argentina), at 93 (how
Brazil’s devaluation affected the bloc); at 98 (Paraguay and Uruguay cannot leave the bloc
due to its economic dependency).
170
The biggest step so far has been the reform of the Brazilian social security system,
which is in the final phase of approval by congress as of the writing of this paper. Without this
reform, Brazil is expected to be bankrupt in less than ten years.
171
As of 2019, Brazil ranks 109 out of 190. The Ease of Doing Business rank can be
accessed at https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/rankings (last visited Sept. 19, 2019).
172
Mr. Fernandez is a member of the nationalist Peronist movement, and defended the
return of Peronist policies during his presidential campaign. https://www.wsj.com/articles/
argentinas-alberto-fernandez-leads-results-of-presidential-vote-with-47-2-support11572223112 (last accessed in May 2021).
173
Porrata- Doria supra note 90, at 10, 17, 57-58, 69-70; Gantz supra note 15, at 365 and
391; Paiva supra note 140, at 125; Hummel & Lohaus supra note 127, at 65.
174
See FRANCISCO DUINA, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF FREE TRADE: THE EUROPEAN
UNION, NAFTA, AND MERCOSUR (2006).
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these rules.
The institutions within MERCOSUR are weak and do not foster the
proper environment for the coordination and unified application of proper
market policies. Professor Trachtman’s analytical framework and theory of
international economic organizations show that for the success of an
integration mechanism, it is necessary that the members empower the
institutions and relinquish control over common affairs to the
MERCOSUR,175 as we can observe under the European Union. Rulemaking
authority, which sets the responsibilities and benefits of the market actors
and promotes regulatory predictability, will reduce the influence of
uncommitted members and the risk of unpredictable and uncoordinated
individual response to an economic downturn, crisis, or recession.176 Key
protocols have not been properly implemented by the members up to the
writing of this paper, illustrating the current state of disharmonized
legislation within MERCOSUR.177 The investor-state dispute resolution
established through the Protocol of the Colonia and the Non-Party Protocol
has not been ratified by any of the members since their signature more than
a decade ago.178
D. Lack of Commitment to Trade Liberalization
There are many examples of public policies adopted by the members
that depart from the goals of MERCOSUR. In 1999, Argentina imposed
import quotas on some of the goods traded with Brazil in response to the
devaluation of the real.179 In 2012, Brazil and Argentina had adopted
protective measures to balance trade in cars and parts under the Car
Agreement with Mexico, which resulted in the renegotiation of the
agreement changing the provisions from tariffs to tariff-rate quotas, in spite
of Mexican efforts to increase trade liberalization under the agreement.180
Furthermore, the Common External Tariff (CET) still has special products
that the members can set their own tariffs independently from each other.181
175
Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of International Economic
Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 470
(1996).
176
Porrata-Doria, supra note 91, at 41, 61, 71.
177
For a full list of all Protocols decisions and treaties under the MERCOSUR and status
information visit https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/documentos-e-normativa/tratados/.
178
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 380.
179
The real has been the Brazilian currency since 1994. When it was introduced, the real
had a fixed exchange rate with the U.S. dollar of 1:1, but such a plan was not sustainable, and
the 1998/1999 economic recession led to the devaluation of the real.
180
THE ECONOMIST, supra note 100.
181
Gantz, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS supra note 15, at 370. In December 2020, the
Brazilian government informed, through its official media vehicle, “Agencia Brasil”, that the
revision of the CET has been postponed to 2021 https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/en/
politica/noticia/2020-12/mercosur-puts-common-externa. For the CET most current list, visit
the MERCOSUR official website at https://www.mercosur.int/politica-comercial/ncm/.

168

Forget BIT
41:139 (2021)

The bloc does not have sufficient coordination for the treatment of tariff
distribution among themselves after entry of goods; for this reason, if the
goods cross borders within the bloc they pay duty twice.182 No customs union
can function without the implementation of a system that collects the
common tariffs at the port of entry and remits it to the country of ultimate
destination.183 Finally, more than twenty-five years have passed since the
establishment of MERCOSUR and still, there is neither full integration nor
free trade of goods, and not much improvement in intra-regional trade in
services.184
E. Other Considerations
MERCOSUR was established over twenty-five years ago with
ambitious goals towards liberalization of trade and regional socio-economic
integration. It was intended to give a voice to South America in the
globalization arena and crown Brazil as an influential country both politically
and economically not only in the Southern Cone but globally. Today the bloc
has not developed much beyond the progress achieved during its first five
years of existence. It has neither achieved the goal of integration among the
members nor has it become the voice representing South America. The
MERCOSUR members identified the structure required to achieve its goals
in its earlier years; nonetheless, they have not been able to develop and
implement them as a strong independent body.185
MERCOSUR never acquired the necessary independence from the
members’ governments, maintaining its initial intergovernmental approach.
As if an infant, MERCOSUR is still dependent on presidential diplomacy to
determine and implement the bloc’s agenda.186 The control over common
affairs has not been relinquished to the bloc because the necessary
institutional infrastructure has not been constituted.187 The institutional
weakness of MERCOSUR is what empowers the major members, Brazil and
Argentina, to impose their own domestic agenda on the bloc if they are in
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 15, at 371.
Id.
184
MERCOSUR R.I.P.?, THE ECONOMIST (July 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/
21558609/.
185
The current structure of the MERCOSUR. Its organogram and existing offices within
the bloc, confirms the members’ understanding of the needs of a strong common market
agreement. However, the lack of implementation of approved norms and protocols, hinders
evolution of MERCORSUR towards fulfilling its potential. Gantz, REGIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS supra note 15, at 391; Porrata-Doria, supra note 91.
186
Hummel & Lohaus, supra note 126, at 69-74.
187
One example is the creation of the Parlasur, which is the common Parliament. The
members created the Parliament in 2005 and except for Paraguay, the state members have not
implemented domestically the selection process of their representatives. Such process has
already been defined by current MERCOSUR regulation. All the regulation is available at
https://www.mercosur.int/pt-br/documentos-e-normativa/tratados/.
182
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sync or otherwise further disrupt the bloc’s agenda.188 In line with the theory
presented in this article, such weakness continues to compromise
MERCOSUR’s success as a freer trade market. Here we see the disadvantage
of not having a developed country in the bloc. As we discussed above, it was
the influence of the U.S. that pushed Mexico to implement regulatory reform
domestically.189 Also, we can see the dominance of Germany and France in
some areas of the EU, but with a more coordinated agenda.190
The political character and the strong influence of the members’
domestic agendas remain present in the MERCOSUR activities. Only five
years after being admitted in the bloc, Venezuela was suspended from all
rights and obligations under MERCOSUR in response to Mr.Maduro’s
policies that have ruptured the democratic order.191 As the members of
MERCOSUR experienced, once again, change in government leadership
moving away from left-wing leaders, the members’ political agenda is
reflected in the bloc decision to suspend Venezuela.192 I believe that, in spite
of the most recent political animosity between Brazil and Argentina193
MERCOSUR may renew its purpose of economic integration, but for the
bloc to regain the momentum, it will require more than the recent agreement
signed with the European Union.194
I believe that the MERCOSUR has become a cautionary tale with
188
GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS supra note 15, at 388-389. The ascension of
Venezuela during the Presidency of Mr. da Silva in Brazil, and Mr. Kirchner in Argentina
confirms this point.
189
Gillman, supra note 38.
190
Here I refrain from making any judgment of the appropriateness of such dominance as
it has been appointed as one of the possible reasons for the Brexit. My point here is that when
the supposed dominance is exercised by a developed country, the impact is not as negative as
seen in the MERCOSUR because there is proper observance of the rule of law and the overall
goals of the bloc.
191
MERCOSUR/CMC/ACTA N. 01/17. For access to the full decision on Venezuela’s
suspension visit the MERCOSUR official website at https://documentos.mercosur.int/
public/reuniones/doc/6354.
192
Such suspension is more in tune with the purpose of the MERCOSUR, but with strong
institutions the MERCOSUR would not be so susceptible to the political winds of the region.
193
Brazil and Argentina have been quite vocal about their mutual dislike and conflicting
political agenda. Unfortunately, for the MERCOSUR, they have been using the bloc to
threaten each other. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/personalanimosity-between- argentine-brazilian-leaders-complicating-relations-between-southamericas-largest-economies/2019/12/08/06313c9c-0702-11ea-911825d6bd37dfb1_story.html; https://www.batimes.com.ar/news/latin-america/were-not-aburden-fernandez-clashes-with-mercosur-leaders.phtml; https://www.dw.com/en/brazilthreatens-mercosur-exit-if-argentina-opposition-wins-presidency/a-50045628.
194
The free trade agreement between these two blocs was signed in June 2019, after many
years of slow negotiations. The agreement is not in force yet and it is under scrutiny by EU
members such as France, which are in clear opposition to many of the policies being
implemented by the current Brazilian president, Mr. Bolsonaro. The official press release
referent to the agreement is available at https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id
=2039.
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lessons on what not to do, guiding present and future regional trade
integration endeavors. Without a strong domestic commitment to open
markets from its key members – Brazil and Argentina – the region would
have benefited more from a less ambitious free trade agreement than the
regional integration proposed under MERCOSUR. Nonetheless, even a less
ambitious agreement would have required regulatory reforms to promote
stable economic growth, as I demonstrate when discussing the positive
impact of NAFTA above.
For these reasons, MERCOSUR is neither an instrument that promotes
domestic governance nor a pro-trade regulatory environment. Therefore, it
does not promote the inflow of the correct balance of FDI. Although Brazil
has received high levels of FDI, the country has not been able to promote a
healthy level of inflow of greenfield FDI, which, according to my theory, is
one of the reasons for its unstable and unsustainable spurs of economic
growth.
6.

CONCLUSION
Mexico’s choice of trade liberalization and acceptance of international
law, combined with the conclusion of NAFTA and its concomitant effect,
have promoted stable, if slow, economic growth. This is due to the resulting
pro-trade regulatory environment, which has stimulated the inflow of
greenfield and vertical FDI. Even though Mexico has not implemented all
the reforms that would promote even greater growth and stability, it opened
its market and promoted open market policies for the past twenty-five years.
It is still too early to know how the country will fare under Mr. Lopez
Obrador’s more populist policies, but if the renegotiations of NAFTA and
the ratification of the USMCA (the new NAFTA) are any indication, I do
believe Mexico may continue moving its economic policies in the right
direction.
Meanwhile, Brazil’s enforcement of protectionist measures under
import substitution economic policies and the weakness of MERCOSUR can
be identified as one of the causes for the country’s sporadic periods of
economic growth followed by long periods of recession and stagnation.
Under a more pro-trade administration, Brazil may start moving in the right
direction.195
NAFTA was negotiated under the auspices of a strong developed
country with a very strong private sector, with both the U.S. government and
the private sector actively promoting the conclusion of the agreement, all
with the ultimate strong support of another highly developed country,
Canada. Such strength influenced Mexico’s market opening, complemented
195
Brazil’s current Minister of Economics, Mr. Paulo Guedes, and his immediate team are
graduates from the Chicago School of Economics, and the ones who graduated from other
programs have published many studies, papers and other research geared toward freer trade
policies as a more efficient way to promote stable economic growth.
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by Mexican President Carlos Salinas’ commitment to essentially all the same
objectives. Meanwhile, MERCOSUR was an overly ambitious project
negotiated and implemented under very protective market conditions
strongly influenced by the nationalist policies that were being implemented,
and to some extent still are, within its member nations.196 The lack of a
developed country as a member, and without any membership states have a
sufficiently strong private sector, which would favor rather than oppose freer
trade, resulted in the MERCOSUR not being a force moving its members
towards a freer market.197
The fact that most empirical studies of FDI do not separate data from
greenfield-FDI to acquisition-FDI,198 and the high level of horizontal FDI
captured by Brazil, explains why Brazil is reported to receive more FDI than
Mexico. However, the concentration in acquisition and horizontal FDI does
not promote the same stable economic growth experienced by Mexico.
Mexico’s commitment was strengthened under NAFTA and further
consolidated by the domestic implementation of regulatory changes in favor
of market deregulation.199
Brazil has since been diverging even further away from the global trade
market as it continued to refuse to implement the minimum protection of
foreign investments such as through the ISDS mechanism and other
necessary regulatory reform. The inaugural speech of the Brazilian President,
Mr. Jair Bolsonaro200 indicated the possible emergence of a new era, moving
away from recent protectionist policies towards the liberalization of trade and
the reinforcement of contractual obligations and property rights, perhaps
including protection and attraction of foreign investment.201 However, there
are so many domestic issues that need to be addressed in Brazil, including
violence, corruption, and the environment, that the international trade agenda
Paiva & Gazel, supra note 141 at 116; GANTZ, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra
note 15 at 391-392. See generally, Carranza, supra note 138.
197
Gilman, supra note 38, as the author explains the positive results from USA pressure
over Mexico during the NAFTA negotiations.
198
Ferret, supra note 63.
199
Fingar, supra note 40.
200
The inaugural speech in Portuguese is available at https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/
politica/noticia/2019-01/no-discurso-de-posse-bolsonaro-pede-apoio-para-reconstruir-opais),Mr. Bolsonaro was elected President of Brazil in November 2018, and inaugurated on
January 1, 2019. President Bolsonaro was elected as the symbol against corruption and with a
liberal economic agenda.
201
President Bolsonaro has promised to bring Brazil to the top 50 under the Doing Business
ranking, and to implement policies towards freer market. Bolsonaro’s inaugural speech, on
January 1, 2019 and his open speech at the 2019 World Economic Forum Annual meeting,
emphasized the promises of his presidential campaign (summary available at
https://www.weforum.org/press/2019/01/we-are-building-a-new-brazil-says-newly-electedpresident-bolsonaro/; and the full speech is available at https://www.weforum.org/events/
world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-2019/sessions/special-address-by-jair-bolsonaropresident-of-brazil.
196
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is not among its first priorities.202
Mexico has also elected a new President, and as in Brazil, this election
has great significance as the platform of Mr. Lopez-Obrador is directly
opposite to that of the former President, Mr. Pena-Nieto.203 Brazil is moving
away from left-wing policies while Mexico is embracing them. The next few
years will show whether Mexico’s existing strong commitment to freer
markets can hold up under the guidance of Mr. Lopez-Obrador, who took
office December 1, 2018. It is still early to tell, as it is with Brazilian
President, Mr. Jair Bolsonaro.
Although this paper identifies how regional trade agreements can
support developing countries’ economic growth through the promotion of a
mix of horizontal and vertical investment as well as a balance between
greenfield and M&A FDI, there are many questions that remain to be
answered. New governments taking place in Mexico and Brazil will
undoubtedly offer a great case study for further evaluation of the long-term
impact of RTAs. Will the USMCA agreement, when it enters into force,
flourish and continue to bring benefits to Mexico as did NAFTA, even under
a nationalist/populist government? Many of the necessary reforms are still
underway in Mexico; how much of this political change will affect Mexico’s
economic stability and FDI inflow?
As for Brazil, seeing that MERCOSUR did not have the expected
impact, and to this day it is not closer to becoming a powerful trade bloc than
it was twenty-five years ago, we must ask what should happen next with the
bloc. Should Brazil take the lead once again and exert the necessary pressure
on its neighbors to move towards the long-expected economic integration? It
does not seem that either Brazil or Argentina has the necessary strength and
influence to do so.
Brazil’s new President has promised to bring the country toward a new
era of open markets and freer trade. What are the necessary reforms within
the country that can promote a balanced inflow of FDI, greenfield, and
acquisition, which will support the country’s growth? Should those reforms
be coordinated with Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay to improve not only
national but regional economic growth?
202
The main focus of this administration has been the reform of the retirement pension
system, which is the major economic issue in the country. This reform will change the
structure of the social security system in Brazil. Once the reform is approved the Brazilian
government is expecting to see an increase in investment and industrial development along
with financial savings in the order of over $10M per year.
Hamilton Ferrari & Alessandra Azevedo, Reforma da Previdência deve economizar R$ 1,164
trilhão em 10 anos, CORREIO BRAZILIENSE (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.correio
braziliense.com.br/app/noticia/economia/2019/02/20/internas_economia,738665/impactoda-reforma-em-10-anos-e-de-r-1-164-tri-ministerio-da-economia.shtml.
203
For better understanding of Mr. Obrador and his political agenda visit
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Andres-Manuel-Lopez-Obrador. News coverage of
Mexican elections in 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-44646478.

173

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

41:139 (2021)

Finally, future empirical studies should measure greenfield and M&A
FDI inflow to better inform trade policies and necessary regulatory reforms
that will support developing countries’ stable economic growth. The
important question is not “Do BITs work?” but how RTAs can support the
inflow of the right type of FDI that promotes stable economic growth.
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